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INFORL"\IAL AND PARALLEL MONEY/FINAL"fCIAL 
MARKETS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Introduction 
Informal and parallel money/financial markets (IFMs) are controversial, widely discussed, 
growing rapidly and poorly understood at the present time in Mozambique as well as in 
many other developing countries [Medina, Nisbet, Soto, Vletter]. The controversy results 
from views held by many people that IFMs are monopolistic, exploitative, illegal, usurious 
and unproductive, marginal enterprises. These views frequently result in governments 
adopting a hostile view of the IFMs and pressure to adopt policies to control IFMs. The 
controversy surrounding IFMs may also result in part from the wide variety of phenomena 
that can be included in this sector and consequently the difficulty that people have in 
understanding IFMs. 
IFMs may be defined as market transactions involving the creation of financial assets and 
liabilities contracted without the intermediation of formal financial institutions, such as 
commercial banks or savings and loan associations. These financial assets and liabilities 
do not appear on the books of formal financial institutions. For this reason, an important 
characteristic of IFMs is that such transactions escape the review and control of monetary 
authorities such as central banks and other regulatory agencies, whereas formal financial 
institutions are subject to these controls. This freedom from central bank regulation is the 
characteristic most frequently mentioned as the essential difference between informal 
financial markets and the formal financial market. 
However, ]FMs are not totally exempt from regulation. IFMs are subject to some regulation 
such as that found in the commercial code that governs contracts, promissory notes and 
mortgages • but not monetary regulations such as interest rate controls and reserve 
requirements, nor reporting and audit requirements. 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate IFMs in Mozambique. The types, 
conditions, terms and users of IFMs and the relationship between formal financial 
institutions and informal lenders are investigated. Case study interviews with individuals, 
firms, researchers and policy makers in the private and public sector were completed in 
February of 1993. 
The main types of informal and parallel money /financial markets that individuals and firms 
may use to obtain funds or lend funds include foreign or domestic suppliers, clients, family, 
friends, remittances, moneylenders, other businesses such as storeowners, pawnshops, 
employees,, cooperatives and credit unions, rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAS, or Xitique), non-government organizations (NGOs), finance and leasing 
companies, and other. Most if not all of these types of informal and parallel mon-
ey /financial markets are used extensively in 'Mozambique as well as in many other 
countries. 
Size of IFMs 
Some indi¢ations of the importance of informal finance can be found in recently completed 
research on IFMs by several individuals (Adams, Adams and Fitchett, Floro, Germidis, 
Ghate, Harriss, Larson, Medina, Soto, and Vletter ]. These studies have found large and 
growing IFMs that offer a broad range of valuable services to savers and borrowers in many 
countries of the world. ·Three broad groups of savers and borrowers can be identified: some 
savers and borrowers prefer to use the informal markets for many different reasons, some 
use both informal and formal markets and others are forced to the informal markets by the 
failure of formal financial institutions to serve their financial needs. 
It is very probable that IFMs provide financial services for a majority of people in 
Mozambiq~e. Given the level of income and economic and financial development of the 
country, it is likely that formal financial institutions serve the financial needs of less than 15 
percent of the population (Survey results show only one percent of Maputo households had 
bank credit and 28 percent had savings deposits). The majority (probably over 85 percent) 
depend upon IFMs for whatever financial services they may need. 
While precise numbers are not available, wage employment provides another indication of 
the size of IFMs. The International Labor Office estimates that over 60 percent of the 
urban labor force works in the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa. This percent of labor 
in the informal sector is most likely higher for 1\-faputo than for sub-Saharan Africa because 
of the problems facing Mozambique in recent years. According to Vletter, wage 
employmetiit equals about one million Mozambicans, including about 200,000 from rural 
areas. All others in the 7 to 8 million labor force are either unemployed or hold non-wage 
employment. A large majority of this labor force will depend upon IFMs for financial 
services. 
The size of, the "loan portfolio" of the IFMs is difficult to estimate because those who know 
most about1 the amount of money do not want to talk about it. As indicated above the IFMs 
most likely exceed the formal financial institutions in number of clients but not in amount 
of money. Based on preliminary balance sheet information from the two major banks, 
Banco Comercial de Mozambique (BCM) and Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), 
the loan portfolio as of October 31, 1992 is around US$ 250 million. The formal sector loan 
portfolio is slightly higher if one includes the loans of the one private commercial bank in 
the country. 
An estimate of the amount of funds in IFMs, based upon interviews with a number of 
people in the private and public sector, is a loan portfolio in the range of USS 50 to 100 
million for IFMs, or 20 to 40 percent of the size of the formal sector loan portfolio. One 
should also note that the IFM credit is very short term credit (generally no more than 30 
to 60 days) so that the amount of credit will revolve at least six times in one year. 
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Conditions Affectin2 IFMs 
Many economic and non-economic conditions influence the size, types and use of informal 
and parallel money /financial markets. Among the most important non-economic conditions 
one must include peace, stability and confidence in the country. The Mozambique economy 
has experienced a severe and prolonged period of decline as a result of continuous civil war 
over the past thirty yeari. The signing of a peace treaty in October-November of 1992 that 
ended a long war has greatly improved the prospects for peace and a return to stability, 
confidence and economic progress in the country. When individuals and families no longer 
have to wQrry about the possibility of leaving the country as refugees, they will likely change 
their investment behavior from flight capital out of the country to thinking about staying and 
investing m the country to build their future. 
Financial .sector repression causes the movement of many market participants to the 
informal sector because the formal sector ceases to provide satisfactory service. After 
independ~nce in 1975, the financial sector repression began when the formal sector banking 
system was essentially nationalized to create a single commercial/ central bank (Banco de 
Mozambique) and a development bank (Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento ). The quality 
of .financial services declined dramatically. Financial repression typically includes attempts 
by governments to direct credit to targeted beneficiaries at preferential and frequently 
negative real rates of interest, to control interest rates on loans and deposits, to control 
exchange rates, to set high reserve requirements, as well as other interventions. Ultimately, 
financial repression leads to many distortions and a failure of the financial markets and 
institutions. Fortunately, the Government of Mozambique (GOM) has made major progress 
toward liberalizing its financial markets since 1987. The GOM recognizes the need to 
continue this process in order to create an efficient and competitive financial sector with 
significant private sector participation in which all borrowers (including GOM) pay positive 
real rates of interest on loans, and savers have incentives to save - attracted by positive real 
rates of interest on financial instruments. 
As has been shown in financial sector study of September, 1992, the real level of commercial 
lending has declined throughout much of the 1980s and into the 1990s [World Bank]. The 
credit to GDP ratio has declined from about 0.60 or 0.70 in the early 1980s to 0.40 or 0.50 
in the early 1990s. The credit ceilings imposed since 1987 and the financial repression 
mentioned above explain much of this decline in real lending. Because of the decline in 
real commercial lending, many borrowers have been rationed out of the formal financial 
market system to the informal finance sector and the remaining borrowers have little credit. 
The government share of total credit also appears to have increased in this same period 
causing private sector credit to decline even more than total credit. Further analysis of 
credit indicates that bank lending has become increasingly short term oriented to commerce 
and industry rather than longer term investment credit. In addition, the share of credit to 
agriculture (about 40 percent in 1990) has declined more rapidly than the share of credit 
to other sectors. 
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The GOM controls interest rates on deposits and loans. Three levels of lending rates have 
been usecl to set preferential rates by economic sector. Some rates such as for the Caixa 
de Credito Agrario e Desenvolvimento Rural have been set very low relative to the inflation 
rate. Recently, interest rates have been simplified to two levels of lending rates. Rates have 
been readjusted regularly but always seem to lag the inflation rate so that· the real rates 
continue to be negative. 
The latest adjustment was effective 10 November 1992 when interest rates on time deposits 
were set at 43 percent for up to one year (Table 1, "Aviso No 3/GGBM/92"). Rates are 
slightly higher at 44 percent for 1 to 2 year deposits and 45 pc.rcent for deposits over 2 
years. B~ may choose to pay up to 3 percent annual interest on demand deposits. 
Interest rates on short term loans (up to one year) are 43 to 44 percent and 45 percent on 
medium loans (1 to 3 years) and 46 percent on loans over three years (Table 2, "Aviso No 
4/GGBM/92"). Given a GOM estimated inflation rate of 50 percent for 1992, positive real 
interest rates on deposits and loans have not been achieved. Savers have no incentive to 
save, and the borrowers have very strong incentives to borrow. Savers are being taxed and 
borrowers· are being subsidized with this interest rate structure. The demand for funds by 
borrowers is very large compared to the supply of funds from savers so that credit from the 
financial system must be rationed. 
The above interest rate structure also clearly creates an incentive for banks to lend short 
term rather than long term even though policy makers express concern over too much short 
term finanbing and lack of longer term financing. The spread between the cost of long term 
deposits and the long term lending rate (0 to 1 percent) creates no incentive for banks to 
mobilize these deposits. 
i Advanta~e1s of IFMs 
Interviews 1with borrowers and lenders revealed a number of reasons why borrowers choose 
lFMs rath~r than formal financial institutions. Notwithstanding interest rates charged to 
borrowers ,in IFMs that frequently can be higher than interest rates from formal financial 
institutions, borrowers are attracted to IFM lenders because of their many advantages. 
Among these advantages is access to credit in IFMs. A very high percentage of the 
borrowers from the informal sector do not have access to funds from the formal sector 
because of lenders' banking requirements such as character and collateral. This access 
includes low borrower transaction costs due to a location advantage of greater proximity to 
the borrower, especially in rural areas, which reduces the borrower's time costs and travel 
costs to obtain a loan. Access to credit is also easier because of the longer hours of service 
provided imcluding weekends and evenings and because of a more familiar, more personal 
and less intimidating environment for the borrower compared to a formal financial 
institution.: Borrower transaction costs are reduced because the amount of paperwork 
required for a loan is minimal and may be only a verbal agreement. 
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Borrowers like IFMs because the use of the funds is not restricted to a designated activity 
in contrast to development bank and some commercial bank lending which attempts to limit 
financing to a targeted set of approved activities. 
Borrowers consider that quickness (timeliness) in obtaining a loan from an IFM lender is 
a major advantage. Lenders in IFMs provide timely service in making loans compared to 
many delays of weeks and even months of waiting to obtain a loan from many formal 
financial institutions [Vletter]. 
Flexibility represents another important advantage of IFMs. 'This includes flexibility of 
interest rates depending on the risk and credit worthiness of the borrower and the size of 
the loan. (Small loans carry higher interest rates than large loans). IFM lenders have more 
flexibility of loan size and interest rates to serve a broader range of borrower needs than 
formal financial institutions. Commercial banks do not have as much flexibility because of 
interest rate controls. IFM lenders also offer considerable flexibility on loan duration and 
the scheduling of repayments. · 
Because of lower lender transactions costs. IFMs can profitably make a large number of 
small loans to serve the important small borrower market segment that formal financial 
institutions cannot profitably serve. Commercial banks simply cannot lend small amounts 
profitably on such a short term basis because of their high lender transaction costs and long 
delays. 
One of the more important advantages of IFM lenders is the ability to place more emphasis 
upon trust and confidence in the borrower through face to face transactions between 
creditor and borrower. IFM lenders can place more emphasis upon trust and confidence 
because they typically have information about the borrower through other business 
relationships. The IFMs offer more flexibility in loan collateral than commercial banks. 
Depending on the borrower and lender, IFMs will frequently lend without collateral or 
accept a Wlide variety of items as collateral for a loan. Hi~h repavrnent rates are obtained 
in the informal sector- which is not to say that bad debts do not exist in the IFMs. 
Household Formal and Informal Finance 
A USAID /OSU study surveyed 330 households in the Peri-Urban area of Maputo to obtain 
baseline data on household socio-demographic and economic characteristics in 1991 
[Graham et.al.]. This section reports on some of the results of this study. Earnings ranged 
from Mt 40,000 to 50,000 per month or 20 to 25 dollars per month or 240 to 300 dollars per 
worker pet year for the sample of households using an average exchange rate of Mt 2,000 
per dollar. 
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Household Credit 
Formal or !institutional credit was essentially non-existent in the household sample (less than 
1 percent of household heads and spouses had bank loans in the last six years). No loans 
were reported from credit unions, projects or cooperatives. Slightly over 1 percent of the 
households reported loans from the employer, generally as an advance against salary or 
wages. · 
Nearly half (45%) of the households reported some form of informal credit within the last 
year: 16 percent had loans from friends and neighbors, 14 percent had loans from family 
members, and 7 percent had loans from groups to which they belong. About 2 percent 
reported lcPans from traders or suppliers. No one reported a loan from money lenders. 
Most loans were for cash with credit purchases of goods or services as the second most 
important type of loan. 
Nearly 19 percent of the household sample reported receiving remittances during the last 
year and only 4 percent sent remittances outside to others. About half the remittances were 
in the form of goods brought back by a person and about 12 percent of remittances were 
in the form of cash. Mozambicans working in South Africa, particularly in the mines, and 
also in other countries may explain much of the remittances. 
Household Savings 
Formal sav!ings deposits were reported by 28 percent of the sample of household heads and 
principal spouses combined. Holders of savings deposits generally reported higher average 
monthly in~omes (Mt 162,688) than the average for all households in the sample. These 
savers also! had more education (88 percent with two or more years) than the households 
without sav!ings deposits (69 percent with two or more years of education). Hotel/restaurant 
workers, government employees, transport, and construction/ government workers reported 
the highest frequency of bank accounts. 
Informal Savings in Xitique (ROSCA) 
The most common informal savings practice is the Xitique (ROSCA) among the reporting 
households. The bairro or quarteirao (to cover emergency or funeral expenses) is also 
common among the reporting households. The money keeper, frequently a store keeper or 
other trusted individual who holds the savings of people, is present but uncommon among 
the househ~lds. About 18 percent belonged to some informal savings group with 84 percent 
of those b~onging to a Xitique. The average monthly income for saving group members 
was Mt 94,736. 
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The Xitique is a voluntary, informal rotating savings and credit association found in many 
developing countries. The Xitique consists of a relatively small number of members (from 
4 to about, 40 members) who share a common bond such as belonging to the same family, 
gender, ethnicity, shared work space, or living in the same neighborhood. The group selects 
one member as the group leader and organizer. Each contributes an equal amount to a 
common fund at regular intervals (weekly, monthly, etc.) with one selected member 
receiving the full amount of the fund at each meeting. The recipient may be chosen 
randomly or, more commonly in Mozambique, a pre-arranged order is established. 
Members receiving loans continue to pay until all members of the group have received a 
loan. No explicit interest rates are charged. 
Each individual knows that at some time the full amount of the fund will be available to 
him for a purchase. The individuals with the early payout have a slight time advantage, but 
all individuals know they will get a payment before the group ends. The individual 
frequently buys a good or service that cannot be purchased from their regular income. 
After everyone has received a loan, the group will normally start over. Social and group 
pressure guarantees that all members pay. The individuals like the idea of the commitment 
to forced saving with the group and prefer this forced saving to a bank account where the 
deposit may not be made or the temptation to withdraw early is very strong. The groups 
work well tuid default is very unusual. 
The average Xitique consisted of about 5 members that meet every 20 days with an 
individual contribution of Mt 7,823 or about 8 percent of income in the household survey. 
Total funds passing through a Xitique averaged Mt 1,444,982 annually (US$ 722). The 
average member contributed Mt 246,879 per year (USS 137) to the Xitique and received 
13.42 payouts. About 10 percent of the households belonging to a Xitique belonged to more 
than one. Households in the education, government, and commerce sectors reported the 
highest levels of participation. Because a wide range of socio-economic groups participate 
in Xitiques, the amount contributed can vary widely from one group to another. ~fore than 
half the Xitique members from the survey were women. 
It is interesting to note that many Xitigues operate regularly among the employees within 
the banks. Employees seem to prefer using the xitique to using a bank account. The 
xitiques operate as a small bank for savers within th~ bank. 
Trader Credit 
A related USAID/OSU study surveyed 73 petty traders (mainly retail vegetable traders) in 
five markets in the peri-urban area of Maputo in 1992 (Llttle ]. Over 95 percent of the 
traders interviewed were women with an average age of 38.7 years, an average education 
of 1.73 years and average household size of 6.95 persons. Average trading income was 
reported to be Mt 22,068 per week plus other household income of 4,608 to equal 26,676 
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weekly or about USS 13.00 per week at an exchange rate of 2,000 mt per USS 1.00 at the 
time of the study (an average of the official exchange rate of 1,800 and the parallel market 
rate of 2,200). Somewhat surprisingly, a bank account was reported by 22 percent of the 
traders. 
Widespread use of informal savings and credit activities were reported by these traders. 
Credit is an important component of the relationship between traders and their suppliers. 
Forty-five percent of traders reported receiving credit from their suppliers, often by delaying 
payments to the suppliers until after the goods are sold. In some cases, the supplier 
advanced the initial capital to help the trader establish her business and then continued to 
supply heii with products. In other cases, the trader may work for the supplier on a 
commission or consignment basis rather than work as an independent trader. In this case 
the relationship is more like an employer-employee. 
Fifty-five percent of traders belong to informal rotating savings and credit association 
(ROSCA or Xitique ). The most common uses of the Xitique credit were for household 
expenses (66 percent) and for business investment (32 percent). Traders who belong to 
Xitique groups reported average weekly incomes of Mt 33,827 (about USS 16.90) nearly 
twice the income of Mt 18,631 for those traders who do not belong to these groups. 
Short term credit from foreign suppliers (excluding large amounts of donated food aid) is 
also very common among merchants for food and non-food goods in Mozambique. Most 
of this credit originates from suppliers in South Africa and to a lesser extent from 
Zimbabwe for merchants in Maputo. The credit may range from 30 to 90 days at an 
interest rate of 1 percent per month on the outstanding balance. The foreign suppliers 
provide credit as a way to facilitate the sale of goods, and the local merchant finds this 
credit attractive, fast, simple to obtain and a reasonable interest rate. Knowledge of the 
customer and trust represent the most important ingredients in the financing transaction. 
The local merchant knows that he must repay his loan to continue receiving goods in the 
future. 
Interviews with traders completed by Zaque also found short term credit to be very common 
and that a few traders used barter to swap goods from Mozambique for imported goods 
Trust and confidence based upon existing business relationships were said to be important 
in credit transactions (Appendix A). 
Short term credit from foreign suppliers finances the importation of many consumer goods 
that have a high turn over. This includes beer, soda, fruits, vegetables, canned goods, frozen 
foods, clothing, household items and electronic goods. These foreign supplier credits appear 
to be quite large because Mozambique imports 80 to 90 percent of total consumption of 
these items. The foreign supplier requires payment in dollars or Rand that merchants usually 
buy in the parallel market. 
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Many of these goods appear to enter Mozambique without paying all of the taxes and tariffs 
that are paid for goods entering legally. These goods can be sold at lower prices in the 
market place than goods imported legally causing problems of unfair competition for the 
formal sector merchants who pay all the taxes and tariffs required. However, interviews 
indicated that some formal sector merchants also operate in the informal sector by financing 
the sale of goods to small traders as a way to compete and avoid taxes. 
Merchants complain that the high taxes and tariffs on imported goods contribute 
substantially to the problem of goods imported illegally. For example, imports of modem 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and chemicals pay a total of ~bout 70 percent in duties, 
taxes, and fees. Importers complain that a S 1.00 item will cost S 1.70 when all costs are 
paid; duty :is 35 percent on the cif value, plus a 7.5 percent surcharge, plus a 10 percent 
consumption tax, plus all the port costs. 
In rural areas the rural shop owners (Lojistas) and itinerant traders (Ambulantes) purchase 
most of the production from small and medium producers and sell them food and farm 
inputs [MOA/MSU /UA]. The rural shop owners purchase the majority of the output and 
the itinerant traders are the next most important buyers. The itinerant traders are the new 
entrants to the market and represent new competition for the rural shop owners. Farmers 
have benefitted from the competition in the form of higher prices and better service. 
Producers have important inform.al finance links with these buyers through credit received 
from shop owners for the purchase of food and supplies and sometimes the sale of their 
output to the buyers on short term credit. Some farmers have complained about payment 
delays from the merchants and generally the shortage of credit for their activities. These 
buyers could become an important credit link between the formal sector banking system and 
the small and medium producer as the country begins to rebuild its rural infrastructure and 
marketing network. 
Credit From Bankin~ System Float 
Another "informal" source of funds that traders and others may exploit is through check 
kiting in the banking system. Merchants and others have discovered that the inefficiency 
of the banking system in combination with the problems of a large branch network in a 
country at war leads to long delays (months and even years) in the clearing of checks 
credited to;payee's account and debited from the payer's account. According to newspaper 
reports, some bank employees have contributed to the delays by holding the checks in some 
instances (See Table 3, Noticias article dated 23 February 1993). The GOM desires to 
reduce substantially this float and is developing plans to solve the problem. 
Merchants and others also employ pre-dating of checks as a means to obtain short term 
credit. If spmeone wants to buy goods for :Mt 15,000 and doesn't have the funds to pay for 
the goods, he may be able to persuade the seller to accept three Mt 500.00 plus some 
interest with each check pre-dated for deposit by the seller at 30, 60, and 90 days after the 
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initial sale of the goods. In such a transaction, the seller assumes the risk of non-payment 
on one or more of the checks and generally may not be interested in this alternative. The 
amount of credit obtained in this manner is likely to be small because many merchants have 
indicated that accepting checks in the Mozambique of today is risky at any time. Many 
merchants· prefer to conduct business on a cash basis. 
Parallel gchan2e Rate Markets 
Mozambique foreign exchange rate policy has moved toward a mQ.re market oriented policy 
since 1986 when the exchange rate was substantially over-valued. The central bank 
estimates tlhat the parallel exchange rate was about 45 times higher than the official market 
rate in 19~6 compared to a parallel rate that is about 20 percent more than the official 
market rate at the present time. This progress toward an exchange rate approximatirig the 
free market rate improves significantly the incentives to export and the competitiveness of 
export products as well as reducing significantly the subsidies on imports. Incentives to 
conduct business in the parallel exchange rate market are also reduced. 
Exchange rate markets quote three rates at the present time. The official rate of the 
metical is pegged to a basket of six currencies in which the South African rand and U.S. 
dollar have the greatest weight, and the Portuguese escudo and the Zimbabwe dollar also 
have important weights. The central bank monitors, calculates and quotes the official rate 
to commercial banks daily. The official rate (Mt 2,927 per U.S. dollar on 25 February 1993) 
encompasses transactions for items such as imports, remittances, debt payments, and some 
exports (Table 4). 
A secondary market rate (Mt 2,949 per USS on 25 February 1993) operates for many 
commerciail transactions that cannot be completed at the official rate (Table 5). Exporters 
can sell certain goods at this higher rate. The Bank of Mozambique desires to increase 
competitioh in this market and licenses traders of foreign exchange in the secondary market 
(six tradeci licensed to date). Users generally agree that service has improved with the 
added COIDl.Petition. 
The parall¢l market rate depends upon the official rate and secondary market rates as well 
as the market forces of supply and demand. The parallel market rate is currently about Mt 
3,600 to 3,700 per USS. Traders in the parallel market rate do not have government 
licenses to exchange money, but are permitted to operate in the market. The money 
exchange seems to complement other merchant activities. Many traders appear to operate 
in the paraJlel market because they need hard currency to pay for their imports from South 
Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Individuals and businesses also buy and sell in this 
market for 1a variety of reasons such as a more attractive rate, because of restrictions on the 
amount of foreign exchange that Mozambican travelers can take when leaving the country, 
and capital flight to other countries. 
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Dollarization of the economy is also quite evident as one talks to users of the financial 
system. The number of people who hold dollar deposits as well as the amount of the 
deposits ~pears to be quite large. In the largest bank of the country, Banco Comercial de 
Mozambique, the value of customer deposits in foreign currencies exceeds the value of the 
deposits in meticais. Many of the reasons for holding these deposits are discussed in an 
earlier section of this report. 
Individuals can withdraw up to US $ 300.00 from their accounts in cash every month and 
firms can withdraw up to US $ 2000.00 per month in cash. Many appear to make these cash 
withdrawals regularly and then convert the cash to meticais in th~ parallel market for their 
living expenses. The parallel market rate has the advantages of better rates, convenience, 
fast service, no paper work, etc. for these transactions. 
Just as in many other countries of Africa, the Indian merchants seem to be dominant in 
trade, commerce and money exchange in Mozambique. Generally, they are successful 
merchants who are innovative, hard working and contribute much to the local economy. 
They have very good informal contacts, locally and internationally, through which they 
conduct many business transactions. Within the Indian community they rely upon informal 
finance to assist in the financing of these business transactions. They also help each other 
to establish new businesses or to expand existing businesses through this informal finance. 
These merchants also rely upon formal credit to finance their operations. 
Non-Government Orianizations (NGOs) 
The inform.al finance sector also includes the activities of many non-government 
organizations (NGOs) that operate in Mozambique. According to UNIDO, over 200 NGOs 
supply a wide range of disaster relief and rehabilitation services to low income and displaced 
people. The programs of the NGOs assist agriculture, communications, construction and 
water, education, fishery, health, non-food relief, relief food, small industries, and women's 
activities. 
Although most of the NGOs concentrate in the greater Maputo area, every province of the 
country has some NGO activities. The annual budget of the 50 most active NGOs exceeds 
US $ 160 million. 
One of the services of the NGOs frequently includes a directed credit component that is 
intended to benefit a selected group with short term financing at low interest rates. In many 
cases, the NGOs administer their credit programs directly to the beneficiaries. Training and 
technical assistance for the beneficiary is usually a requirement of these programs. In many 
other countries, the financial performance of these credit programs leaves much to be 
desired because the transaction costs per beneficiary tend to be very high and the loan 
repayment record very low. In many cases the credit component turns out to be a grant to 
the beneficiary because of the poor repayment record of these programs. This may also be 
a problem in Mozambique. 
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Cooperative Credit and Credit Unions 
One fin~ institution that serves small savers and borrowers successfully in many 
countries is the credit union. The credit union is a cooperative form of organization 
emphasizing saving and credit that is owned and operated by the member patrons. Credit 
unions are popular in many countries of Africa, South America, and Asia. Cameroon, for 
example, has very strong credit unions that finance short term activities and even long term 
housing finance. Credit unions are popular because of the many advantages they offer in 
terms of low transaction costs, flexibility, and local ownership and control. On a continuum 
from formal financial institutions at one end to informal financial institutions at the other, 
credit unidns are less formal than banks but more formal than xitiques in organization and 
operation. 
The survey results reported above indicated that no households were members of a credit 
union. Additional investigation indicates that the credit union concept and movement is not 
operating in Mozambique at this time. The feasibility of starting credit unions in 
Mozambique should be explored. 
Some agricultural marketing cooperatives obtain credit for their activities through the 
banking system (BPD) with the support of The General Union of Cooperatives (See Zaque 
interview in Appendix B). The General Union of Cooperatives has about 132 member 
cooperativ¢s (originally 180) with each member cooperative having about 25 to 30 individual 
members. Some of the services offered include credit in kind for supplies such as feed, 
seed, etc., transport, marketing and education. Cooperative membership consists mainly of 
women producing and selling chickens, fruits, vegetables, and services such as com milling. 
The Union has problems of past due loans with its member cooperatives and is working to 
solve those problems. 
The May l cooperative has a 3 year loan from the BPD for Mt 8 million to construct more 
buildings for chicken production. The Union co-signed the bank note. Interest is at 46 
percent annually with annual payments of interest and principal. According to the 
cooperative officers, this cooperative had one other loan from BPD that was repaid 
successfully. 
Finance and Leasin~ Companies 
Although some finance and leasing companies may operate in Mozambique, none was 
identified in the household survey or in the field work during February of 1993. Finance 
and leasing companies provide valuable financial services in many countries, particularly for 
consumer durables, machinery and equipment, and could very likely provide the same 
service in Mozambique. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
IFM operations are not well documented which has also led to severe under-estimation of 
the importance of IFMs in Mozambique and other countries. IFMs demonstrate 
considerable flexibility in their operations, including taking advantage of the legal system 
and variotis aspects of the commercial code whenever the benefits exceed the costs. Their 
diversity and flexibility has allowed IFMs to serve far more clients than are served by formal 
financial markets and institutions, in spite of the hostility often expressed by formal sector 
agents and by policy makers and government officials charged with financial sector 
regulation. Even if the formal financial system were operating efficiently in a free market 
environment, IFMs would exist. Thus, attempts to eliminate IFMs by government regulators 
would appear to be neither possible nor desirable. 
Financial market repression such as interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits, overvalued 
exchange ~ates, high bank reserve requirements and loan targeting forces much financial 
activity intp IFMs which are not subject to these controls. The best way to attract funds and 
customers from IF~fs to the formal sector is through financial market liberalization. 
Fortunately, the Government of Mozambique (G01-f) has made major progress toward 
liberalizing its financial markets since 1987. The GOM recognizes the need to continue this 
process in order to create an efficient and competitive financial sector with significant 
private sector participation in which all borrowers (including GOM) pay positive real rates 
of interest on loans, and savers have incentives to save - attracted by positive real rates of 
interest on financial instruments. 
The formal financial system can learn some important lessons from the financial services 
provided by IFMs. With respect to lending by IFMs, operators of formal financial markets 
and institutions can learn much about client selection and loan recovery that would allow 
these institutions to deal with potential borrowers whom they have neglected in the past 
(e.g., small-scale enterprises, small commercial farmers and others who live in urban and 
rural areas). The formal banking system could serve more of these clients with more 
aggressive 1deposit mobilization, a simpler loan application, disbursement and collection 
process, and more attention to customer service. Formal lenders will also need the 
opportunity to set interest rates freely and flexibly to reflect the full costs of dealing with 
new types of clients -- otherwise, they will have no incentive to expand their client base. 
Policy makers must recognize the importance of market-determined interest rates for formal 
lenders, together with the fact that attempts to repress IFMs will not only largely fail but 
will also drive up the costs of financial services for all users. If there are examples of the 
exploitatiop. of borrowers by informal lenders, such abuses should be dealt with through the 
promotion of competition among lenders or through the legal system. 
Another significant aspect of IFMs is their savings mobilization activities, which may be 
extensive but largely undocumented. The xitique is by far the most extensive, popular and 
successful of these institutions in Mozambique. The particular characteristics of a xitique 
may offer clues on how to initiate successful credit union services. It is well known that 
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credit unions mobilize deposits successfully in many countries of Africa and elsewhere. The 
Cameroon program to strengthen credit unions in their ability to provide a wider array of 
financial services on a more sustainable basis to many savers and borrowers exemplifies 
what can be done. Credit unions can become an important link between the IFMs and the 
formal financial sector. A study of their viability in Mozambique is recommended. This 
study should be commenced by the time of World Banlc approval of the proposed financial 
sector structural adjustment loan. 
In addition, finance companies, credit card and leasing companies also mobilize deposits in 
many countries. Finance companies are successful in deposit mobilization primarily because 
they offer higher interest rates than formal financial intermediaries that are limited by high 
reserve requirements and low interest rates on loans. Leasing companies have also found 
success in countries such as Bangladesh (Singer Company leasing of consumer durables) as 
a way to lend money to creditworthy customers who have the use of the goods as they make 
the payments. Opponunities may exist for these types of companies in :Mozambique and 
should be explored. 
Some of the lessons that can be learned from the operations of IFMs in Mozambique should 
be quite clear both for government policy makers and for operators of formal financial 
markets and institutions. If interest rates that formal financial institutions pay on deposits 
are repressed by interest rate ceilings and other policies, potential depositors will seek 
outlets in lFMs for their savings -- which, however, may tum out to be more risky as well 
as more rewarding. For policy makers, an appropriate response is clearly greater incentives 
for deposit mobilization by formal financial institutions that currently have very little 
incentive to mobilize deposits. 
There is an emerging view of IFMs among some policy makers and researchers that 
recommends that the IFMs be incorporated in government and donor projects or linked with 
formal financial institutions. There are some examples of positive interventions in other 
countries. The Philippines is one country that has adopted this approach through programs 
linking banks to input suppliers, rice millers, traders and producers. Such an approach may 
be possible in Mozambique through the rural shop owners, itinerant traders and others as 
the country begins to rebuild private sector trade in urban and rural areas. Other 
successful programs that merit more investigation and possible application to Mozambique 
include the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the Badam Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) and Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa (BUD) in Indonesia, and the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand. 
However, there are also examples of negative interventions, such as programs that involve 
NGOs in targeted lending at below-market interest rates to small-scale enterprises. These 
programs have not only tended to compromise the viability of participating NGOs but have 
also achieved only limited outreach in other countries. Many development bank programs 
have also failed to reach the targeted clients with a viable self sustaining program such as 
the Caixa de Credito Agrario e Desenvolvimento Rural in Mozambique. 
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Programs . to formalize IFMs may also be counterproductive, as IFMs may lose their 
flexibility and no longer be able to serve even their traditional clients efficiently. It appears 
that IFMs can at least provide some lessons for policy makers and for the managers of 
formal financial markets and institutions, and provide financial services for clients who 
would not otherwise receive them. This is nonetheless a significant accomplishment 
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Table l 
BANCO DE MO<;AMBIQUE 
AVISO N° 3/GGBM/92 
Ao abrigo do disposto no artigo 53 da Lei ng 28/91 de 31 de 
Dezembro, · sabre Taxas de· Juro, o Governador do Banco de 
Mo<;ambique de~ermina: · · 
1. Sao fDcadas as segulntes ta..xas de juro anual para: 
- Dep6sitos a prazo 
Ate 365 dias ..................................................... · ·43°10 
1 a 2 anos ......................................................... · 44o/o 
·Mais de 2 anos .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ..... . 45°/o 
- Os dep6sitos a ordem poderao ser remunerados, a criteria de 
cada banco comercial,. a ta..xa de juro ate 3°/o 
2. 0 regime de ta"ras ora fu(ado ~plica-se tanto aos dep6sitos a 
prazo constituidos a partir·da data de entrada em vigor do 
presente aviso, bem como aos e..x:i~tentes nessa data, cujas 
condi<;6es se considerem alteradas nos termos e para os 
efeitos do presente. nao tende havido manifesta<;ao expressa 
de vontade do depositante em centrario. 
3. As duvidas suscitadas na interpretac;ao e aplica<;ae do presente 
aviso s·erae esclarecidas per a vise do Governader do Banco de. 
Mo<;ambique. 
4. As ta.xas ora fixadas entrarn em vig<?r em 10 de Novembre de 
1992 . 
. Publique-se 
Maputo, 9 de Novembre de 1992 
0 Governador do Banco de ~1o~am~ique 
(Adriano Afonso Maleiane) .. 
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Table 2 
B~NCO DE MO<;AMBIQUE 
.AV.ISO N° 4/GGBM/92 
Ao a'b:rlgo do disposto no artigo 53 da Lei n° 28/91de31 de Dezernb.ro. 
sobreTaxas d~Juro, o Governadordo Banco de M0<;ambique deterrnina: 
1. Sao .. fi..xadas as· seguintes taxas de juro ~ual .para opera<;oes de 
credito: : · 
I. -· .As· ta.xas de redesconto do Bar1co Central passam para 43°/o. 
Mantem-se os limites percentuais de utiliza<;ao. em percentagem 
sabre OS dep6sitos .~ ordem. 
a) Redesconto: limite ate 6o/o ........... ... prazo ate 2 semanas 
b) Acrescimo ate 6% .. ... ... .... .. ... . . . .. . . . . prazo ate 1 semana 
(Neste caso. a taxa sera agravada em 2°/o) 
If-As taxa~ dejuro do credito a praticar pelos ba..ricos comerciais aos 
diversos sectores de actividade econ6rri..ica passam a ser as seguLrites: 
CURTO PRA.ZO I 1rIBDIO /LONGO PRAZOS 
\ 
ate 180 d ate 365 d II ate 3 g_ I ma.is de 3 g_ I 
l ; 43°/o 44°/o II 45°/o I 46% II 
(onde p<:>r !!, devc-se entender dias e !. anos) 
~- O regime de taxas ora fLxado podera aplicar-se, tambem. ao credito 
-em vigor na data de inicio da vigencia do presente aviso. quando no 
respective contra.to esteja prevista a altera<;ao da taxa de"juro em caso 
de fLxa<;ao legal do outro limite. 
3. As duvidas suscitadas na interpreta<;ao e aplica<;ao' do presente 
aviso serao esclarecidas par aviso do Governador do Banco de 
Mo~ambique. 
4. As.'taxas ora fixadas entram em vigor em 10 de Novembro de 1992. 
PU.blique-se 
.:Ma.p·uto, -9 de Novembre de 1992 
O Governador do Banco. de Mo<;ambique 
(Adriano Afonso lrialeiane) 
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Table 3 
Processo de burla no BPD remetido ao Tribuna_t ·da Cidade 
0 processo envolvendo os empres<irlos moc;amblcanos Pedro Pinto e Jt.illo Tandane, fol remetldo ao · 
Tribunal da Cldade de Maputo, na sexta-felra passada, segundo revelou ontern ao uNotlclas• o Procurador 
da Aepubllca na capital do pals, Dr. Afonso Antunes. 
Alnda o.ntam o nosso Jornal 
contadou uma fonla id6noa do Tribunal 
da Cidado quo confirmou a entrada do 
roferido processo. 
Segundo a fonte, o caso jA se 
ancontra a soguir toda a tramitac;ao 
julgada nocessar:a, ambora o tribunal 
sa encontra em perlodo de l0rias 
judiciais. 
.. Qs actos qua estlio a serpraticados 
par est a institu~o constituem segrodo 
do justic;a, palo qua nao oslamos 
autorizados a prestar qualquor 
doclarac;ao publica. 0 Julz-Pro-.kJonto 
oncontra-sa do l0rias asslm coma o 
pr6prio tribw·.al, mas dada a naturaza 
do processo ludo esta a sar 
encaminhado•, ravolou a Ionic quo 
tomos vindo a citar. 
Par sou turno, o Procurador da 
Aapublica na cidado do Maputo, Dr. 
Afonso Antunes, dou a conhocor ao 
.. Notlcias• quo o Minist6rio Publioo 
roquor em diligilncias a instruc;~o 
contrudit6riaquo vao sor roalizadas pok> 
juiz. 
Sabre a passive I data do jukJamonto 
dos elemontos envolvidos na alogada 
lrauda do bili6os do moticais ao Banco 
Popular de Dosenvolvimonto (BPO), o 
nos so inlormador dis so lratar-so do um a 
rnat6ria qua dopendora das diligllncias 
qua forom efoctuadas polo Tribunal da 
CkJado. 
•N6s vamos acompanhar o 
juk.Jamento at~ ao fim. 0 Minist6rio 
Publico ao deduzir a acusac;:oo concluiu 
quo Pedro Pinto e Julio Tandano 
cometoram os crimes do amiss~ de 
choquos som cobortura o do burta par 
dofraudac;:ao. Rolatlvamonto aos dais 
ox-funcionarios bancarios, 
nomoadamonla Manuel Sumbana e 
Analdioo Mdurfcio ora df;ltidos, posa 
ainda o crime do abuso do cargo• -
aJiafl(fOU aquala magislrado. 
A fonto assa<Jurou ao oosso Jornal, 
quo os prazos de prisao prnvontiva para 
os luncionario dotidos ainda nao 
o)(piraram. 
Em moados do Janeiro do ano om 
curso, o Prosidonto do Consolho do 
Adrninlstra.';oo do UPO, Harmonanikio 
Gamito, 101 nou ptiblico quo a instiluk;l'lo 
quo dirigo fol dosfalcada em mais do 3 
bili6os do moticais, par Pedro Pinto a 
Julo Tandano. Na ahura, Gamito admi1iu 
qua o valor pudosso atinnir os quatro · 
bili6es da meticais com a indusao do 
juros. 
Poslorlormonte foi tamb~m rovolado 
quo os dais emprosarios ~mbicanos 
haviam fugidodo pals para local incorto, 
equo logoquoopcocessofossa roma1ido 
ao Tribunal da Cidado, os acusados 
seriam julgados A rovelia 
S6 quo em enlrevista ao •Nollcias• 
o causldio de Pedro Pinto, Dr. Albano 
Silva, negou publicamento quo o seu 
ciionle tivasso fugldo do pals. 
Segoodo lnformac;Oos por ala 
prastadas, o seu clionto saiu 
normalmonlo do Moc;ambiquo pola 
trontoira do aoroporto de Mavalano a s6 
nao ralomava aopalspar alegadamonta 
lor·lho sido passado um mandala d& 
captura. · 
O Ministorlo Publico roaglu A esta 
lnformat;oo, afirmando qu& •n6s ntlo 
acoitamos condi<;{>os lmpastas polos . 
autores do crim&s. Se elo (Padro Pinto) 
quisor regrossar pod a fazll·k> livromont&, 
mas devera · · aujeitar·se tu. 
consoqullncias prevlstas na lei':'. , .. . 
Table 4 
BANCO COHERCIAL DE MOCAMBIQUE, SARL 
BOLETIM DE CAMBIOS A PRATICAR AO PUBLICO 
POR UHIOADE DE MOEOA ESTRANGEIRA 
A VIGORAR EM 25 DE FEVEREIRO DE:t99! 
BoLe~Lm NumeAo 39/93 I 
------~--------------------------------------------------
PAIS ES 
E~..ta.d.o..6 Un.i.d.o-4 
A6.1t.i.ca. d.o SuL 
A.le..ma.n.ha. 
Au...s.t-i.i.et 
B il.g .i.ca. 
C a.n a. d. d. 
D .i.n.a.ma..1tca. 
E ..6 pa.n.hd. 
F .i..rt.t .. a.nd.i.a. 
FA. a.n r; a. 
Ho.t.a.n.d.a. 
Ingla..te...1t-t.a. 
I .t.a...t.i..a.. 1 
Japd.o 
Ma..l.a.w.l 
No1tu.e.gq. 
PaJT.t.uga...t. 
Su.e.c.i.a. 
Su.i.s:ct 
Za.mb.i..a 
Z.i.mba.bwe. 
J.f<JEOAS 
DaLa..1t. 
Ra.n.d. 
J.4a.JtCO 
X.el...i..m 
FllClfl.CO 
Do.la.Jt. 
CO.JLOCl 
Pe....se..ta. 
J.f CL It k. k. CL 
F1ta.nco 
F 1.. v 1t .i.m 
L.i.01ta. 
Li.1ta. 
I e.n.e. 
Kwa.ch.a. 
C01tOC4 
E~cu.d.o 
co..,,oa. 
F;r..a.n.co 
Kwa.cha. 
Do.t.a.1t 
CANBIO DE 
COMP RA VENDA 
2 927.5398 
936.5T31 
813.2796 
257.9331 
87.9405 
2 318.8435 
471.8033 
25.0217 
497.8810 
534.4664 
1 611.637i 
4 227.36i6 
1.8453 
25.0538 
660.7398 
423.8205 
19.6810 
378.7244 
964.1327 
6.6607 
456.6656 
• 
2 993 . .!0'75 
957.5846 
854.0784 
263.7366 
89.9792 
2 371.0174 
432.4189 
25.5847 
509.0833 
546.4979 
1 647.8996 
4 322.4833 
1.8868 
25.61i5 
675.6065 
.433.3564 
20. 7 238 
387.2451 
2 008.3257 
6.8106 
466.9406 
---------------------------------------------------------
MAPUTO, 24 De FEVEREIRO DE 1993 
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Table 5 
BANco~nEMO<;AMBIQUE 
Cambios Medias Praticados no Mercado 
Secundaria.de Cambios em 24 de Fevereiro 
de 1993 par. Unidade _de_ Maeda Estrangeira 
BOLETIM NUMERO 39/93 
PAfSES • · · MOEDAS 
E.3t&.dos Unidos --- 06la:r 
Ame.a do Sul ----·' R.and 
A!C'Tlr..h.a ------·. Marco 
Fr.any.s --------·.' ~ 
lngl.at.l:':TJ. -----. Lor.a 
Porrugal -----~ E.3cueo 
Suf~• --··-· --·~ Fr.anc:o. 
Ot.JTRAS INFOi:l."iA<;O~ 
· ·. COMPRA 
·2 949.0000 
959.4900 
1 800.4200 
.. 534..5100 
4 294.9300 
. 19.8600 
l 963.7800 
VENDA 
3 015.3600 
981.0700 
l 840.9300 
546.5300 
4391.5700 
20JIOO 
2 013.0800 
1. PRIME RATE- Nov.a Iorquc: ___ ······-·-·----
2. UBOR (London lntc=bznk Offered R1.1..c) 
'' 6 meses. ___ ..,;. ___________ .:_ __ . ______ .... 3-5/16 % 
3. OURO ..:...-usD/On'2: .·-
Compn · _ _: __ :.,: _ _:: __________ . ---·--····-···· 330.35 
y c:tC.. _:_ _________ . _____ :...:...----·-·---·--· 330.85 
4. UAPT A (UciJdade de Cont.a do PT A) . 
Compra ·-·--------...:.---------- MT 3 762.6368 
V oea -···--------· -----·---·----· MT 3 781.4500 
BOLETIM EM 25 0€ FEVEREIRO i993 .· 
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Persons Contacted in :Mozambique and Germany 
Benfica, Rui Manuel dos Santos. Research Associate, Food Security Project in Mozam-
bique, Ministry of Agriculture/Michigan State University, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Braga, Jose Miguel C. Sequeira. Membro do Conselho de Administracao, Banco Popular 
de Desenvolvimento, Av. 25 de Septembro no. 1184, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Dassat, Alibhai. Director, Mozambique Agencias, Ltd., Av. Karl Marx no. 1744, Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
De Yoest, . Christine. Economist, U.S. Agency for International Development, Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
Duarte, Carlos A Seabra. Presidente do Conselho de Adm.inistracao, Sociedade Textil de 
Vila Pery, S.AR.L. (TextAfrica), Maputo, Mozambique. 
Jose, Patricio. Director, Planificacao Analise E Estatistica, Banco Popular de 
Desenvolvimento, Av. 25 de Septembro no. 1184, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Junior, Pedro Walters. Director, Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento, Av. 25 de Septembro 
no. 1184, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Fraquelli, ltalo D.C. Country Director, United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), Rua Francisco Barreto, 322, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Gamito, Hermenegildo Maria Cepeda. Presidente do Conselho de Adrninistracao, Banco 
Popular de Desenvolvimento, Av. 25 de Septembro no. 1184, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Gregor, Alexander. Consultant G1Z., Feldafing, Germany. 
Grosso, Orlando. Software Department Manager. Engenharia e Comercializacao de 
Sistemas Informaticos (EXI). Siemens/Nixdorf, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Hamela, Hipolito. Presidente. Associacao de Javens Empresarios de Mozambique (AJEM) 
Av. Pereira do Lago, 147, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Heidhues, Franz. Professor, University of Hobenheim, Stuttgart, Germany. 
Koehler, Ana Maria. Delegada, Institute do Comercio Extemo de Portugal (ICEP), Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
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Koneke, Annemarie. Southern Africa Projects, Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (G1Z) GMBH, Eschborn, Germany. 
Kropp, Drl Erhard. Senior Economist, Head of Section Urban and Rural Finance, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (G1Z) GMBH, Eschborn, Germany. 
Magaia, Anierico AA President, Mozambique Chamber of Commerce, Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
Maleiane, ,Adriano Afonso. Governador, Banco de Mozambique-. Maputo, Mozambique. 
Marrule, ilngino Francisco de. Research Associate, Food Security Project in Mozambique, 
Ministry of ..A..griculture/Michigan State University, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Matavel, ,Inocencio, A Associacao Industrial de Mozambique (AIMO), Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
Matos, Jotge. Technical Coordinator, CIBA-Geigy, Av. Mao Tse Tung, 519. Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
Mazive, Francisco Semende. Inspector, Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento, Av. 25 de 
Septembro no. 1184, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Meggi, Chandracant. Director, Empresa Mocambicana de Informatica, Ltd. Maputo, 
Mozambique. 
Pollvogt, Dr. Renate. Section Manager, Southern Africa Division, Deutsche Gesellschaft 
Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (G1Z) GMBH, Eschborn, Germany 
I 
Prosperino, Victor. Gerente, Uniao Geral de Cooperatives, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Schreider, Gertrude. Researcher, University of Hohenheim. 
Sousa, J. Paul B. de. Managing Partner, Peat Marwick, Auditores e Consultores, SARL. 
Avenida 24 de Julho, 2096, Maputo, Mozambique. 
Stiebens, Paula. Administradora Service de Administracao de Projectos, GTZ, Maputo, 
I 
Mozambiqtie. 
Zeller, Marifred. Post Doctorate Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Zenker, Manfred. Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusarnmenarbeit (GTZ) GMBH, 
Eschborn, Germany 
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